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Applied Game Theory for Political Scientists / ゲーム理論による政治分析 POLX301L（数理分析I POLX601L)

• Overview　（Spring 2025)
  This course is “Applied Game Theory for Political Scientists” for the advanced level undergraduate students as well as graduate students. In it, the students will learn how to develop a game-theoretic model to describe and analyze the strategic interactions observed in politics. This year, we will primarily focus on the formal models of crisis bargaining and deterrence for the analysis of the causes of war and conditions for peace, mechanisms of deterrence, the escalation dynamics and risks associated with various deterrence strategies among other issues. In addition, the students will develop and analyze their original formal, game theoretic models on any topic relevant to political science. このコースは政治分析のための応用ゲーム理論の授業です。ゲーム理論を用いて政治において観察される戦略的相互作用を記述し分析する技術を学びます。今年は国際紛争と抑止に関する様々な数理モデルを取り上げ、戦争の原因と平和の条件、抑止のメカニズム、抑止戦略ごとのエスカレーション動態とリスクなどを分析します。さらに、受講者は政治学に係るオリジナルのモデルを作成します。

• Class meetings:
  
  • Monday, 2nd period (10:40-12:20pm)
  • Bldg 3, Room 909
• Textbooks　
  
  • William Spaniel. 2023. Formal Models of Crisis Bargaining: Applications in the Politics of Conflict. Cambridge University Press.
  • Branislav Slantchev. 2011. Military Threats: The Costs of Coercion and the Price of Peace. Cambridge University Press.

• Topics and Schedule　
  Week 1 (April 14)
  　Overview

  Week 2 (April 21)
  The inefficiency puzzle of war and rationalist expalanations for war: a bargaining approach
  Lecture Slides

  • James D. Fearon, “Rationalist Explanations for War.’’ International Organization
    
  • Spaniel, Formal Models of Crisis Bargaining, chapter 2
    

  Repeated Games (Lecture) Part I
  Lecture Slides

  • Robert Gibbons, Game Theory for Applied Economists, Princeton University Press, pp. 88-99, Section 2.3.B “Theory: Infinitely Repeated Games” (If you are new to game theory, please skim Section 2.3 (pp. 82 – 88))
    

  Week 3 (April 28)
  Repeated Games (Lecture) Part II
  (Lecture Slides)

  • Paul Milgrom, Douglass North, and Barry Weingast, “The Role of Institutions in the Revival of Trade: The Law Merchant, Private Judges, and the Champagne Fairs”, Economics and Politics, 2 (1990).
    

  Week 4 (May 12)
  Power and commitment problems in crisis bargaining

  • Spaniel, Formal Models of Crisis Bargaining, chapter 3
    

  Week 5 (May 19)
  Signaling in crisis bargaining
  

  • Slantchev, Military Threats, Sections 2.1 and 2.2.
    

  Week 6 (May 26)
  Commitment v. signaling in crisis bargaining
  

  • Slantchev, Military Threats, Section 2.3.
    

  Week 7 (June 2)
  The art of barganining in coercive diplomacy I
  

  • Slantchev, Military Threats, Sections 3.1 amd 3.2.
    

  Week 8 (June 9)
  The art of barganining in coercive diplomacy II
  

  • Slantchev, Military Threats, Sections 3.3 amd 3.4.
    

  Week 9 (June 16)
  The art of barganining in coercive diplomacy II
  

  • James D. Fearon, “Rationalist Explanations for War.” International Organization, pp.
    

  Week 10 (June 23)
  Nuclear Deterrence models I
  

  • TBA, pp.
    

  Week 11 (June 30)
  Nuclear Deterrence models II
  

  • TBA, pp.
    

Week 12 (July 7)
Alliance models I

• TBA, pp.
  

Week 13 (July 14)
Alliance models II

• TBA, pp.